Even as media in myriad forms increasingly saturate our lives, we nonetheless tend to describe our relationship to it in terms from the twentieth century: we are consumers of media, choosing to engage with it. In _Feed-Forward_, Mark B. N. Hansen shows just how outmoded that way of thinking is: media is no longer separate from us but has become an inescapable part of our very experience of the world. Engaging deeply with the speculative empiricism of philosopher Alfred North (...) Whitehead, Hansen reveals how new media call into play elements of sensibility that deeply affect human selfhood without in any way _belonging_ to the human. From social media to data-mining to new sensor technologies, media in the twenty-first century work largely outside the realm of perceptual consciousness, yet at the same time inflect our every sensation. Understanding that paradox, Hansen shows, offers us a chance to put forward a radically new vision of human becoming, one that enables us to reground the human in a non-anthropocentric view of the world and our experience in it. (shrink)

2009 Massachusetts Institute of Technology All rights reserved. No part of this book may... ISBN 978-0-262-01324-6 (hardcover : alk. paper)— ISBN 978-0-262 -51304-3 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Science— Political aspects. 2. Science and state. 3.

This paper will examine the nature of mechanisms and the distinction between the relevant and irrelevant parts involved in a mechanism’s operation. I first consider Craver’s account of this distinction in his book on the nature of mechanisms, and explain some problems. I then offer a novel account of the distinction that appeals to some resources from Mackie’s theory of causation. I end by explaining how this account enables us to better understand what mechanisms are and their various features.

In New Philosophy for New Media, Mark Hansen defines the image in digital art in terms that go beyond the merely visual. Arguing that the "digital image" encompasses the entire process by which information is made perceivable, he places the body in a privileged position -- as the agent that filters information in order to create images. By doing so, he counters prevailing notions of technological transcendence and argues for the indispensability of the human in the digital era.Hansen examines (...) new media art and theory in light of Henri Bergson's argument that affection and memory render perception impure -- that we select only those images precisely relevant to our singular form of embodiment. Hansen updates this argument for the digital age, arguing that we filter the information we receive to create images rather than simply receiving images as preexisting technical forms. This framing function yields what Hansen calls the "digital image." He argues that this new "embodied" status of the frame corresponds directly to the digital revolution: a digitized image is not a fixed representation of reality, but is defined by its complete flexibility and accessibility. It is not just that the interactivity of new media turns viewers into users; the image itself has become the body's process of perceiving it.To illustrate his account of how the body filters information in order to create images, Hansen focuses on new media artists who follow a "Bergsonist vocation"; through concrete engagement with the work of artists like Jeffrey Shaw, Douglas Gordon, and Bill Viola, Hansen explores the contemporary aesthetic investment in the affective, bodily basis of vision. The book includes over 70 illustrations from the works of these and many other new media artists. (shrink)

When Thomas Nagel originally coined the expression “moral luck,” he used the term “luck” to mean lack of control. This use was a matter of stipulation, as Nagel’s target had little to do with luck itself, but the question of how control is related to moral responsibility. Since then, we have seen several analyses of the concept of luck itself, and recent contributors to the moral luck literature have often assumed that any serious contribution to the moral luck debate must (...) begin with a robust concept of luck simpliciter. I argue here that this assumption is a mistake, on the basis of three reasons: the issue was originally conceived as an issue about responsibility and control, analyses of luck tend to distort and needlessly to complicate what is at issue when shoehorned into the moral luck debate, and these analyses have very little (if anything) to contribute to the discussion. (shrink)

Debates over the politicization of science have led some to claim that scientists have or should have a “right to research.” This article examines the political meaning and implications of the right to research with respect to different historical conceptions of rights. The more common “liberal” view sees rights as protections against social and political interference. The “republican” view, in contrast, conceives rights as claims to civic membership. Building on the republican view of rights, this article conceives the right to (...) research as embedding science more firmly and explicitly within society, rather than sheltering science from society. From this perspective, all citizens should enjoy a general right to free inquiry, but this right to inquiry does not necessarily encompass all scientific research. Because rights are most reliably protected when embedded within democratic culture and institutions, claims for a right to research should be considered in light of how the research in question contributes to democracy. By putting both research and rights in a social context, this article shows that the claim for a right to research is best understood, not as a guarantee for public support of science, but as a way to initiate public deliberation and debate about which sorts of inquiry deserve public support. (shrink)

Arguments for multiple realization depend on the idea that the same kind of function is realized by different kinds of structures. It is important to such arguments that we know the kinds used in the arguments have been individuated properly. In the philosophical literature, though, claims about how to individuate kinds are frequently decided on intuitive grounds. This paper criticizes this way of approaching kinds by considering how practicing researchers think about the matter. I will consider several examples in which (...) the practice of researchers on comparative vision conflicts with the standard account of these issues. (shrink)

In this paper the outlines of an explicitly “Vygotskian” perspective on moral education are sketched. I begin by briefly reviewing and critiquing the two most well‐known and widely used approaches to moral education‐‐the cognitive‐developmental approach and the character education approach‐‐and I suggest that a Vygotskian/socio‐cultural perspective has the potential to address many of the problems faced by contemporary moral educators. Vygotsky's ideas about the “zone of proximal development” are then summarised and those ideas are extended to the domain of moral (...) education, focusing on an excerpt from the film, Boyz ‘n the Hood. Narrative and story‐telling are considered briefly as an example of how the zone of proximal development works to facilitate moral development in a way that is markedly different from that described by contemporary character educators, and I conclude with some brief reflections on questions left unanswered, and speculations about future directions for both theory and practice in moral education from a Vygotskian/socio‐cultural perspective. (shrink)

Kim claims that Bechtel and Mundale's case against multiple realization depends on the wrong kind of evidence. The latter argue that neuroscientific practice shows neural states across individuals and species are type identical. Kim replies that the evidence they cite to support this is irrelevant. I defend Bechtel and Mundale by showing why the evidence they cite is relevant and shows multiple realization does not occur.

Many people today are concerned about the implications of climate change for their personal reproductive decisions. Some have transformed such concerns into activism by engaging in a “birth strike” and publicly announcing their decision not to procreate because of climate change. This article draws on Hannah Arendt to examine the political meaning and significance of birth strikes. It makes three basic points. First, by highlighting the human condition of being born, what Arendt called natality, birth strikes have illuminated a distinctive (...) set of threats and possibilities for climate politics. Second, due to modern consumerism and instrumentalism, which Arendt saw as the dominance of labor and work over action, birth strikes have been misperceived as advocating a reduction in personal carbon footprints and global population growth. Third, birth strikes have clarified some of the challenges for efforts to link the individual and collective dimensions of climate responsibility. (shrink)

Reviews the book "Science, Truth, and Democracy," by Philip Kitcher.

Evolutionary convergence is often appealed to in support of claims about multiple realization. The idea is that convergence shows that the same function can be realized by different kinds of structures. I argue here that the nature of convergence is more complicated than it might appear at first look. Broad claims about convergence are made by biologists during general discussions of the mechanisms of evolution. In their specialized work, though, biologists are often more limited in the claims they make. I (...) will examine a standard example to show how claims about convergence can be oversimplified. (shrink)

A crucial objection to the doctrine of original sin is that it conflicts with a common intuition that agents are morally responsible only for factors under their control. Here, I present an account of moral responsibility by Michael Zimmerman that accommodates that intuition, and I consider it as a model of original sin, noting both attractions and difficulties with the view.

In this paper, I argue that it is quite useful, both theoretically and empirically, to adopt a socio‐cultural approach to the study of moral development. This entails viewing ‘moral functioning’ as a form of mediated action, and moral development as the process by which persons gradually appropriate a variety of ‘moral mediational means’. Mediated action entails two central elements: an ‘agent’, the person who is doing the acting, on the one hand, and ‘cultural tools’ or ‘mediational means’, the tools, means, (...) or ‘instruments’, appropriated from the culture, and used by the agent to accomplish a given action, on the other. I make this argument drawing on recent work in socio‐cultural psychology, specifically the work of James Wertsch (1998). I also consider the work of both Carol Gilligan (1982) and Lawrence Kohlberg (1981, 1984) as illustrative examples, to show how their respective insights about moral functioning and the process of moral development can be interpreted from, and enriched by, a mediated action/socio‐cultural perspective. (shrink)

Many commentators today lament the politicization of bioethics, but some suggest distinguishing among different kinds of politicization. This essay pursues that idea with reference to three traditions of political thought: liberalism, communitarianism, and republicanism. After briefly discussing the concept of politicization itself, the essay examines how each of these political traditions manifests itself in recent bioethics scholarship, focusing on the implications of each tradition for the design of government bioethics councils. The liberal emphasis on the irreducible plurality of values and (...) interests in modern societies, and the communitarian concern with the social dimensions of biotechnology, offer important insights for bioethics councils. The essay finds the most promise in the republican tradition, however, which emphasizes institutional mechanisms that allow bioethics councils to enrich but not dominate public deliberation, while ensuring that government decisions on bioethical issues are publicly accountable and contestable. (shrink)

Philip Kitcher is a leading figure in the philosophy of science, and he is part of a growing community of scholars who have turned their attention from the field’s long-time focus on questions of logic and epistemology to the relation between science and society. Kitcher’s book Science, Truth, and Democracy (2001) charted a course between relativism and realism, arguing that the aims of science emerge from not only scientific curiosity but also practical and public concerns. The book also drew on (...) John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1999) to develop an ideal of “well-ordered science,” and then applied the ideal to various aspects of the scientific research agenda. Ten years later, complex public issues like climate change have grown more urgent, and with many people questioning mainstream science on climate change, evolutionary biology, vaccines, stem cell research, and other topics, the tensions between science and democracy seem more pronounced than ever. Kitcher’s Science in a Democrat. (shrink)

This is a sequel to a recent article arguing that the standard “just-so-story” of the history of Darwinism through the so-called Modern Synthesis has obfuscated the central persistent problem Darwin’s natural selection theory has faced ever since 1859, namely its failure to explain or account for macroevolution and the origin of higher taxa. It also “deconstructed” the standard story and explored the actual disunity underlying the apparent “unity” of synthesis supporters. Here, I explore the various international meanings of “evolution,” “Darwinism,” (...) “Dismal Darwinism,” “Visionary Biology,“ “Modern Synthesis,” “natural selection,” “microevolution,” and “macroevolution” and then focus on the contextual origins, creation, and development of the modern “evolutionary synthesis,” how and why it was so widely and quickly endorsed, how it became the standard “just-so-story” taught by evolutionary biologists and historians alike for so long, and who, how, why, and when the disunity underlying the apparent “unity” re-emerged and the so-called “synthesis” unraveled, as I observed firsthand and experienced it over the past 50 years. (shrink)

Efforts to develop a coherent role for white people in racial justice initiatives in the USA are often stymied by the defensiveness, paternalism, and guilt of many white liberals. Such efforts are also undermined by critiques of whiteness that conflate white identity and white supremacy. I address this dilemma by developing an account of antiracist white identity politics, conceived of here as taking responsibility for the effects of being socially defined as white. I locate conceptual resources for this project in (...) James Baldwin’s reflections on tragedy, love, and identity. In contrast to those who invoke Baldwin to argue for abolishing white identity, I make a case for politicizing it. I draw on Baldwin’s articulation of a tragic sensibility to argue that white antiracism requires accepting a morally compromised identity one has not chosen. It also requires accepting that serious efforts to end white supremacy inevitably lead to mistakes, misunderstandings, and counterproductive outcomes. By adopting a tragic perspective on these aspects of white antiracism, white people would become more capable of forging antiracist white identities through robust engagement in struggles for racial justice. (shrink)

There are a number of considerations, including ethical and clinical or diagnostic factors, in utilizing the diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder in criminal proceedings. The reliability and validity of the diagnosis may be questioned. Legal precedent may consider extant diagnostic criteria for PTSD and comorbid diagnoses. However, these diagnostic criteria are often in flux considering new research findings. For example, the introduction of the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, published by the American Psychiatric Association, (...) includes some changes in the PTSD diagnostic criteria. How will this affect interpretation of past legal judgments? Moreover, PTSD has significant psychiatric comorbidity, e.g., substance abuse, which in itself may influence violent behavior and its consequences. Some of these comorbid diagnoses also have changes in their diagnostic criteria. The introduction of biological tests in the assessment of PTSD will likely facilitate more objective diagnosis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 31.4 (2001) 54-82 [Access article in PDF] Seeing With The Body The Digital Image In Postphotography Mark B. N. Hansen In a well-known scene from the 1982 Ridley Scott film Bladerunner, Rick Deckard scans a photograph into a 3-D rendering machine and directs the machine to explore the space condensed in the two-dimensional photograph as if it were three-dimensional [see fig. 1]. Following Deckard's commands to zoom (...) in and to pan right and left within the image space, the machine unpacks the "real" three-dimensional world represented by the two-dimensional photograph [see figs. 2-3]. After catching a glimpse of his target—a fugitive replicant—reflected from a mirror within the space, Deckard instructs the machine to move around behind the object obstructing the two-dimensional photographic view of the replicant and to frame what it sees [see figs. 4-5]. Responding to the print command issued by Deckard, the machine dispenses a photograph of the replicant which is, quite literally, a close-up of an invisible—indeed nonexistent—part of the two-dimensional original [see fig. 6]. And yet, following the fantasy of this scene, this impossible photograph is—or would be—simply the image of one particular data point within the data set comprising this three-dimensional data space. As fascinating as it is puzzling, this scene of an impossible rendering—a rendering of two-dimensional data as a three-dimensional space—can be related to the crisis brought to photography by digitization in two ways. On the one hand, in line with the film's thematic questioning of photography as a reliable index of memory, this scene foregrounds the technical capacity of digital processing to manipulate photographs. In this way, it thematizes the threat posed by digital technologies to traditional indexical notions of photographic realism. On the other hand, in what has turned out to be a far more prophetic vein, the scene presents a radically new understanding of the photographic image as a three-dimensional "virtual" space. Such an understanding presupposes a vastly different material existence of the photographic image: instead of a physical inscription of light on sensitive paper, the photograph has become a data set that can be rendered in various ways and thus viewed from various perspectives.The first position corresponds to the arguments made by William Mitchell in his now classic book, The Reconfigured Eye. In a comprehensive analysis of the techniques and possibilities of digital imaging, Mitchell concentrates on demarcating the traditional photographic image from its digital doppelgänger. While the specter of manipulation has always haunted the photographic image, it remains the exception rather than the rule: "There is no doubt that extensive reworking of photographic images to produce seamless transformations and combinations is technically difficult, time-consuming, and outside the mainstream of photographic practice. When we look at photographs we presume, unless we have some clear indications to the contrary, that they have not been reworked" [Mitchell 7]. To buttress this claim, Mitchell sketches three criteria for evaluating traditional photographic images: (1) does the image follow the conventions of photography and seem internally coherent? (2) does the visual evidence it presents [End Page 54]Stills from Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982), courtesy of Warner Brothers Home Video. Rick Deckard navigates a two-dimensional image as a three-dimensional space." width="72" height="33" />Click for larger viewFigure 1Still from Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982), courtesy of Warner Brothers Home Video. Rick Deckard navigates a two-dimensional image as a three-dimensional space.Stills from Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982), courtesy of Warner Brothers Home Video. Rick Deckard navigates a two-dimensional image as a three-dimensional space." width="72" height="32" />Click for larger viewFigure 2Still from Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982), courtesy of Warner Brothers Home Video. Rick Deckard navigates a two-dimensional image as a three-dimensional space.Stills from Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982), courtesy of Warner Brothers Home Video. Rick Deckard navigates a two-dimensional image as a three-dimensional space." width="72" height="33" />Click... (shrink)

Poised on the cusp between phenomenology and materiality, media institute a theoretical oscillation that promises to displace the empirical-transcendental divide that has structured western meditation on thinking, including the thinking of technics. Because media give the infrastructure conditioning thought without ceasing to be empirical (i.e. without functioning as a transcendental condition), they form the basis for a complex hermeneutics that cannot avoid the task of accounting for its unthematizable infrastructural condition. Tracing the oscillation constitutive of such a hermeneutics as it (...) serves variously to constitute media theory in the work of critics from McLuhan to Kittler, from Leroi-Gourhan to Stiegler, my interrogation ultimately conceptualizes the medium as an environment for life:by giving concrete form to ‘epiphylogenesis’ (the exteriorization of human evolution), concrete media find their most ‘originary’ function not as artifacts but via their participation in human technogenesis (our co-evolution with technics). (shrink)

It has frequently been argued that there must be a necessary and important difference between the methods of the natural and social sciences, or that an empirical method in social science must be supplemented by or is inferior to an interpretative method. Often these claims have been supported by arguments using premises derived from the early Heidegger or the late Wittgenstein. These arguments, in turn, tend either to be transcendental in form or to follow a hermeneutic argument strategy. This paper (...) argues that neither of these types of argument, based on Heideggerian or Wittgensteinian premises, can be used successfully to show an important or essential difference between natural and social science. It does this by examining arguments proposed by Peter Winch and Hubert Dreyfus, showing how they are fallacious and misconstrue the import of the premises upon which they are based, and generalizing these objections to the transcendental and hermeneutic styles of argument in this field as such. The paper concludes with a consideration of Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, which reaches conclusions in this area which are similar to those of this paper but which, it is argued, misconstrues the character of its own argument. (shrink)

This essay considers the ways in which language mediates and shapes moral experience. It suggests that language and forms of discourse are essential to psychological functioning, because words (and other signs and symbols) provide the ‘tools’ necessary for thinking, feeling and acting. As a result, understanding how language mediates the functioning of the psyche is prerequisite to understanding the ways in which narrative expresses and represents moral experience and moral functioning. This essay also explores the implications of this view for (...) the study of moral development and the practice of moral education. (shrink)

"My aim in this paper is to develop an ontology of media operations that is rooted in Gilbert Simondon’s theory of individuation. I position this media operative ontology in contrast to Bernhard Siegert’s understanding of operative ontology as a cultural technique. Drawing on Wolfgang Ernst, Henri Atlan, and Michel Serres, I argue that Siegert’s position compromises the extra-cultural operationality of technical media, and of techniques more generally, in its bid to redirect media theory from its Kittlerian trajectory. With his theory (...) of information as reception of environmental singularity by a metastable receiver, Simondon provides a mechanism for theorizing how extra-cultural operationality of technical media informs the production of culture and the distinctions upon which it rests, without compromising the alterity of technics. Mein Ziel in diesem Beitrag ist es, eine Ontologie von Medienoperationen zu entwickeln, die auf Gilbert Simondons Theorie der Individuation fußt. Auf der Grundlage von Wolfgang Ernst, Henri Atlan und Michel Serres behaupte ich, dass Siegerts Versuch, die Medientheorie von ihrer Kittlerschen Linie abzulenken, den Stellenwert der außerkulturellen Operationalität technischer Medien und der Techniken im Allgemeinen herabspielt. Mit seiner Theorie der Information als Empfang von umweltlicher Singularität durch einen metastabilen Empfänger bietet Simondon dagegen einen Mechanismus, dank dem theoretisch durchdacht werden kann, wie die außerkulturelle Operationalität der technischen Medien die Kulturproduktion und die Unterscheidungen, auf denen sie beruht, prägt, ohne die Andersheit der Technik zu reduzieren. ". (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to theorize human-technical assemblages as what I call “societies for possibility intensification” (SPI). My thesis is that SPIs constitute a form of human-technology entanglement that doesn’t begin from their separation but that is rooted in the concrete process that brings them into being, from atomic moment to atomic moment, as “real togetherness.” I develop the term “society for possibility intensification” on the basis of my understanding of Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy. For Whitehead, “society” (...) is the generic name for enduring, experiential entities. Atoms, humans, and geological processes are all equally societies on Whitehead’s account. Societies are ongoing compositions of punctual, “perpetually-perishing” “actual entities,” which on Whitehead’s metaphysics, are the really real things and thus the only reasons. “Possibility intensification” builds on Whitehead’s conception of how process operates, namely through the mobilization of the potentiality of the actualities composing the immediately preceding past world. This potentiality – what could have been but wasn’t – remains “available” as a margin of indeterminacy involved in the determination of future process. Possibility intensification designates a way of channeling this potentiality in order to capitalize on the force of the entangled actualities that a society brings together and gives form to across time. Building on my prior description of SPIs (“Prosthesis for Feeling”), in this paper I seek to connect my conception to recent scholarship on the topic of “dividuation.” Dividuation provides a way to understand the force of the actualities composing a SPI without subordinating them to any prior unity. I conceive of the power of technology in terms of this capacity to mobilize the actual elements of reality in this piecemeal, dividual manner. This power can be deployed, as it predominately is in contemporary informational capitalism, to abstract instrumentally from process for narrow ends. Or it can be deployed in the service of possibility intensification where what is at issue is precisely the mobilization of potentiality in an open framework in which what determines the datum for new process is not an extrinsic value imposed on it (e.g., profit or control) but rather the sheer coming-together of dividuals or what Whitehead calls “superjects.” It is in this sense that SPIs are “dividuation machines.”. (shrink)

This paper talks about near-death experiences and their nature causing conflicts with the current view of the body and mind. The paper discusses different views about the nature of the human mind and body.

In a recent article Richard Rorty has attempted to juxtapose Heidegger and Dewey. While finding significant points of agreement between the two, and by implication praising much of Heidegger’s work, Rorty also suggests a series of criticisms of Heidegger. The problems which Rorty finds with Heidegger can, I think, all be reduced to one basic criticism, which has two main sides. In Rorty’s view Heidegger can not really differentiate between Being and beings in the way that he wants, and thus (...) can give no sense to the word ‘Being’ other than the old metaphysical one. That is, Being and the ontological difference are metaphysical remnants, the last evaporating presence of the Platonic distinction of the real world and the apparent world. This is indicated in two ways. First, Rorty feels that Heidegger can make no real distinction between philosophy, which they both agree has ended, and ‘thinking’ in the specifically Heideggerian sense. Second, Rorty claims that it is impossible to distinguish ontic from ontological becoming. That is, the various epochs of Being which Heidegger distinguishes are, for Rorty, parasitic upon and reducible to the ordinary history of man’s activity in relation to things, material and social. As such, Heidegger’s account of ontological epochs is a species of idealistic reflection upon the history of man’s activity upon things. (shrink)

Guy Kahane holds that theism has unattractive consequences, since it threatens both privacy and autonomy. Here, I suggest that Kahane’s position echoes that of Dostoevsky’s famous Underground Man. But the Underground Man is ensnared in difficulties that resemble the problem of absurdity as developed by Thomas Nagel. Dostoevsky’s own solution to that problem involves love—but love naturally invites compromises with respect to privacy and autonomy. Perhaps the best way to solve the problem of absurdity is to make precisely the opposite (...) of Kahane’s axiological judgment— which would recommend pro-theism over anti-theism. (shrink)

Hindu religious and philosophical thought revolves around the basic metaphysical thesis that Atman, the individual self, is identical with Brahman, the Universal Self in which all things are sustained. With a few notable exceptions most Western philosophers have found this thesis too far removed from common sense to consider seriously. My purpose in this essay is to clarify and defend five theses about consciousness which, while formulated independently, have their closest collective affinities to the Advaita Vedanta view of consciousness.

Recently there has been a revival of philosophic interest in, and discussion of, ‘relativism’. Debates concerning relativism, however, tend to have an odd air of unreality. It is odd that while most everyone wants to refute relativism, just about no one wants to be identified as a relativist. There is even a tendency to use ‘relativist’ as an epithet of abuse. But, if relativism is universally acknowledged to be refuted, even self-refuting, then why is there so much discussion of it, (...) and why is there such a temptation to accuse opponents of this sin? The answer to this question which I wish to propose in this paper is that there are two sources for this situation. First, the fact that while no one sees themselves as relativists, many are seen as relativists suggests that there is a fair amount of current confusion in regard to what precisely ‘relativism’ is. Whenever there is a high degree of disagreement about the extension of a term, especially a term used to describe a philosophical position, it is reasonable to investigate whether there is some equivocation in the use of that term. Such an equivocation by itself, however, would not account for the present state of affairs. That ‘relativism’ is only applied to opponents suggests that there is some similarity between ‘relativist* positions, in at least some senses of that word, and some other positions that people are interested in defending. (shrink)

Any solution to the problem of moral luck will have implications for Christian theology, although few scholars have examined the intersection of these two topics in a comprehensive way. This study attempts to fill this vacuum by advancing and developing a counterfactual solution to the problem of moral luck originally offered by Michael Zimmerman. According to that solution, we are morally responsible in virtue of not only what we do, but also what we would have done in non-actual circumstances. This (...) solution carries two significant metaphysical commitments: true counterfactuals of libertarian freedom (the bedrock of molinist accounts of providence) and a haecceity view of personal identity. The resulting account of responsibility eliminates all (the standard) forms of moral luck and connects the agent’s moral status to a particular species of control. This study then examines the nature of that control and the standard objections to a luck-free account of responsibility, and it explores how it is that we are oriented morally to the luck-bound world around us. These findings are then applied to the Christian theological framework, explaining how it is that all human persons may be inescapably and deeply culpable—suffering from original sin—in a way that is consistent with God’s justice and love, and how they yet remain capable of a kind of moral restoration. The project then considers how we might be saved by divine grace and enjoy a kind of heavenly libertarian freedom, while exploring both old and new avenues for Christian theology. (shrink)

This essay first examines a few key aspects of the erosion of public university funding in the United States, showing how the ideal of value-free science has undermined efforts to defend a conception of universities as public goods. Then it considers how advocates of California's Proposition 30, a ballot initiative that restored some public university funding, frequently adopted the same logic of privatization they sought to counteract.

Many commentators today lament the politicization of bioethics, but some suggest distinguishing among different kinds of politicization. This essay pursues that idea with reference to three traditions of political thought: liberalism, communitarianism, and republicanism. After briefly discussing the concept of politicization itself, the essay examines how each of these political traditions manifests itself in recent bioethics scholarship, focusing on the implications of each tradition for the design of government bioethics councils. The liberal emphasis on the irreducible plurality of values and (...) interests in modern societies, and the communitarian concern with the social dimensions of biotechnology, offer important insights for bioethics councils. The essay finds the most promise in the republican tradition, however, which emphasizes institutional mechanisms that allow bioethics councils to enrich but not dominate public deliberation, while ensuring that government decisions on bioethical issues are publicly accountable and contestable. (shrink)

Constructivist technology studies have often cast government as one “social group” among many, reflecting a liberal pluralist view of politics. This article argues, in contrast, that due to the conceptions of citizenship conveyed by policy designs, governments have a special role to play in the shaping of new technologies. This argument is illustrated in the case of the controversial 1996 decision by the California Air Resources Board to significantly revise its electric vehicle program. The article shows that the board’s decision (...) changed the image of citizenship conveyed by its policy design, thus influencing the civic values embedded within electric vehicle technology. (shrink)